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The impact of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 on the credibility
of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts

ABSTRACT
This study examines whether the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC)
Regulation No. 12-1996, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, may
enhance the credibility of management earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses.
Using a sample of 858 IPO earnings forecasts over the period 1991 to 2005, we find that
earnings forecasts have been less optimistic and more accurate after the regulation was
promulgated on December 26, 1996. Overall, our findings suggest that the CSRC Regulation
No. 12-1996 can improve the reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts.

JEL classification: G15, G38, M41, M48
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1.

Introduction
Management earnings forecasts contained in prospectuses for initial public offerings

(IPOs) provide useful information about future firm performance. However, IPO earnings
forecasts are vulnerable to information asymmetry problems because information about an
IPO firm is less available to the public than information about a listed firm, and management
always have better knowledge about their firm’s future performance than outside investors.
Moreover, the credibility of IPO earnings forecasts may be impaired by managerial
opportunism. For instance, management may have incentives to overestimate IPO earnings
forecasts in order to raise more proceeds from the IPO. A significant overestimation of IPO
earnings forecasts may mislead investors, and is usually associated with an adverse market
reaction and a potential legal liability. Consequently, the credibility of IPO earnings
forecasts is a topic of considerable interest to researchers, investors, and regulators.
Research into the reliability of management earnings forecasts in the U.S. started in
early 1970s. However, IPO earnings forecasts are hardly ever addressed in U.S. studies
because earnings forecasts are rarely disclosed in U.S. IPO prospectuses.1 Most of prior
research on IPO earnings forecasts uses data from British Commonwealth countries (Jelic,
Saadouni, & Briston, 1998). So far, fewer studies on management forecast reliability have
been conducted for emerging markets, especially for China. This study provides evidence on
the reliability of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts. We find that the mean forecast error and

1

See McDonald (1973), Imhoff (1978), Jaggi (1980), Porter (1982), and Cameron (1982).
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the mean absolute forecast error are 0.45% and 15.28%, respectively, for a sample of 858
Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005.2
On December 26, 1996, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC)
promulgated a regulation, Announcement of Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares (No. 121996). The Regulation No. 12-1996 (thereafter “the Regulation”) imposes penalties on firms
whose IPO earnings forecasts are significantly overestimated in their IPO prospectuses.
Specifically, the Regulation requires that IPO firms and their auditors must explain and
apologize to the public in a CSRC designated newspaper if predicted earnings are
overestimated by 10 - 20% compared to actual earnings. IPO firms will be penalized if
earnings forecasts are overestimated by more than 20% and the overestimation is deemed to
be a fraudulent activity. Auditors will also be penalized if they issue an inappropriate audit
opinion on a client company’s IPO earnings forecasts. The Regulation also prohibits IPO
firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price.
Although the Regulation was promulgated to improve the reliability of earnings
forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses, it remains an empirical question because the legal
enforcement infrastructure is weak in China. Moreover, Chinese IPO firms are closely
connected with the government, which may provide opportunities for them to override the
Regulation. Hence, whether the Regulation can enhance the reliability of earnings forecasts
is an empirical question. This study examines whether the Regulation has achieved its initial
2

IPO earnings forecasts from some Commonwealth countries seem less accurate than Chinese IPO

earnings forecasts. For example, the mean absolute forecast error is 289% for the Australian forecasts (Hartnett,
1993), 100% for the New Zealand forecasts (Mak, 1989), and 88% for the Canadian forecasts (Pedwell,
Warsame, & Neu, 1994).
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objective. We find that the Regulation has been efficacious in reducing the overestimation of
IPO earnings forecasts after it was promulgated on December 26, 1996. We also document a
significant improvement in earnings forecast accuracy resulting from the promulgation of the
Regulation.
This study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether a securities regulation in an emerging
market can enhance the reliability of corporate financial disclosure. Since there is rare
research into the effects of securities regulations on corporate disclosure, the promulgation of
the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 provides us an opportunity to enrich this research topic.
Second, we document evidence on the efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996. Our
findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the CSRC and other
securities regulators of emerging markets. Third, this study adds to prior research on the
economic determinants of forecast accuracy. Our study suggests some ex ante criteria for
evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces institutional
background. The third section develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses research design.
Section 5 provides empirical results, Section 6 conducts additional analyses, and the paper
concludes in the seventh section.

2.

Institutional Background

2.1

Corporate disclosure in Chinese IPO prospectuses
The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (the CSRC), established in 1992

under the State Council, is the official government authority that is responsible for the
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formulation of information disclosure regulations in the Chinese securities markets. On June
12, 1993, the CSRC issued the first corporate disclosure regulation for public offering
companies, Implementing Standards on Information Disclosure for Shares Public Offering
Companies (No. 43-1993). This regulation required that public offering companies should
disclose information in their initial public offering prospectuses, annual reports, interim
reports, and seasoned public offering prospectuses in accordance with the standards
implemented by the CSRC.
According to the implementing standards, information to be disclosed in IPO
prospectuses includes the issuance price of shares, amount of capital to be raised, total
amount of share capital, intended application of the capital raised, certificate of capital
verification, parties involved in the new issuing, risk and strategy, dividend policy,
underwriting, company’s background, operational performance, report of asset appraisal,
financial information, earnings forecasts, development plan, commitments and litigation, and
so on.3
On January 7, 1997, the CSRC formalized the implementing standards into a
regulation, Standards on the Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Shares
Public Offering Companies: the Content and Format of IPO Prospectuses (No. 2-1997). On
March 15, 2001, the CSRC issued a new regulation on IPO prospectuses, Standards on the
Content and Format of Information Disclosure for Securities Public Offering Companies:
IPO Prospectuses (No. 41-2001), to supersede the Regulation No. 2-1997. The Regulation
No. 41-2001 required that, in addition to the information required by the Regulation No. 21997, IPO firms should also disclose their business and technology, industry competition and
3

See Tang, Chow, and Cooper (1996).
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related transactions, and corporate governance in their IPO prospectuses. Moreover, the
CSRC made a significant change regarding earnings forecast disclosure in the Regulation No.
41-2001. Specifically, the Regulation No. 2-1997 required that companies must disclose
earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses, whereas according to the Regulation No. 412001, companies have the option of not disclosing earnings forecasts in their IPO
prospectuses.4

2.2

The CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996
On December 26, 1996, the CSRC issued a regulation, Announcement of Some Rules

on the Issuance of Shares (No. 12-1996).5 This regulation addresses issues related to share
issuance, including the criteria for initial public offerings, use of the capital raised,
revaluation of assets, earnings forecasts, determination of issuance price, trading of
employee’s shares, issuance costs, and so on.
According to the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, IPO firms and their auditors must
explain and apologize to the public in a CSRC designated newspaper if the predicted
earnings in their IPO prospectuses are overestimated by 10 - 20% compared to the actual
earnings. Penalties will be imposed on the IPO firm if earnings forecasts are overestimated
by more than 20% and the overestimation is deemed to be a fraudulent activity. Auditors

4

IPO firms who voluntarily disclose earnings forecasts in their prospectuses will be penalized by the

CSRC based on the Regulation No.12-1996 (as discussed in Section 2.2.) if their earnings forecasts are
significantly overstated compared to the actual earnings. Indeed, few IPO firms have disclosed earnings
forecasts in their prospectuses after the Regulation No. 41-2001 became effective.
5

This regulation is currently effective.
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will also be penalized if they issue an inappropriate audit opinion on a client company’s IPO
earnings forecasts. Further, the Regulation prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts
as a basis for determining issuance price.6
In 1997, the CSRC publicly denounced eight Chinese listed companies for
significantly overestimating earnings forecasts in their IPO prospectuses.7 For instance,
Zhongyan Tango applied a very high gross profit rate of 80% in developing earnings
forecasts, whereas its average gross profit rate was 20% for the two years prior to the IPO
year. The company’s actual earnings for the IPO year were only 12.30 million yuan,
compared to the predicted 49.97 million yuan in its IPO prospectus. Other listed companies
being publicly denounced by the CSRC in 1997 included Kaidi Silk, Lanlia Chenxiang,
Shijiazhuang Quanye, Wuhan Twin-Tigers, Guhan Group, Huaya Paper, and Northeast
Pharmaceutical.
In addition to the eight listed companies, three accounting firms were also penalized
by the CSRC for their deceptions and frauds in conducting the audits of IPO earnings
forecasts. Specifically, Shenyang Certified Public Accountants received a disciplinary
warning and a pecuniary penalty, and Beijing Certified Public Accountants and Shijiazhuang
Certified Public Accountants were publicly denounced.

6

IPO earnings forecasts provide forward-looking information about an IPO firm’s future cash flow, and

thus affect corporate valuation reflected in stock prices (Miller & Modigliani 1961). Hence, although not to be
used in determining issuance price after the Regulation No.12-1996, IPO forecasts are still important for
investors in making investing decisions.
7

See Qi, Wu, and Zhang (1998).
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3.

Hypotheses Development
Effective on December 26, 1996, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 was formulated

because Chinese securities administrators were seriously concerned with the reliability of
IPO earnings forecasts. Under the Regulation, IPO firms are not allowed to use earnings
forecasts as a basis for setting issuance price. Moreover, any significant and opportunistic
overestimation of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses will be penalized by the CSRC.
The Regulation may influence both the benefits and the costs of overstating earnings
forecasts. Before the Regulation, earnings forecasts were allowed for setting issuance price.
Hence, if earnings forecasts were overstated, the issuance price would also be exaggerated.
The Regulation prohibits IPO firms from using earnings forecasts as a basis for determining
issuance prices, thus reduces the instant benefits of overestimating earnings forecasts.
The Regulation also increases the potential costs of overestimating earnings forecasts
in at least three ways. First, any penalty from the CSRC will lower the reputation of an IPO
firm and its auditor, especially as the penalty is publicly announced. Second, the stock
markets will react adversely if an IPO firm is penalized for overstating earnings forecasts. A
decline in stock price will consequently reduce the wealth of a large number of shares owned
by the management of the firm. Further, it will be more difficult to obtain approval for
seasoned equity offerings from the CSRC if a firm had once been penalized for a fraud.
Seasoned equity offerings may be an important tunnel for Chinese listed firms to survive
when incurring significant operating losses. Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996
increases the costs and decreases the benefits of overstating earnings forecasts, and thus may
mitigate opportunistic overestimation of earnings forecasts and enhance the reliability of the
forecasts.

7

However, prior research shows that legal enforcement is different across countries
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Silances, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). In countries with weak
enforcement environments, a regulation may not be strictly enforced even though the
regulation itself is well designed, and consequently, may not meet its initial objective.
Moreover, Cai (2007, pp.7) argues that “the China Securities Regulatory Commission (the
CSRC), the executive branch body that is responsible for enforcing the securities law, has
also not proven to be effective, independent, or professional based upon international
standards”. Thus, the weak legal enforcement infrastructure in China may impair the
efficacy of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996.
Prior research also suggests that political connections may relax regulatory oversight
of a company in question (Faccio, 2006). Politically connected firms are more likely to
obtain assistance from the government (Faccio, Masulis, & McConnell, 2006). Most of
Chinese IPO companies were state-owned enterprises before they went public, and the
majority of their shares are still owned by the government after initial public offerings. Fan,
Wong, and Zhang (2007) further find that about 27% of CEOs from a sample of 790 Chinese
IPO firms are former or current government bureaucrats. Overall, Chinese IPO firms are
closely connected with the government, and thus may take advantage of the affiliated
relationship to challenge the authority of the CSRC, a regulatory body that is also highly
affiliated with the government. Thus, the effectiveness of the CSRC regulation is
questionable considering the prevalence of political connections between Chinese IPO firms
and the government.
In summary, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 may increase the reliability of IPO
earnings forecasts as the costs (benefits) of opportunistic overestimation will be higher

8

(lower). However, the positive impact of the regulation on forecast reliability might be
attenuated due to the weak legal enforcement infrastructure and the solid political
connections between IPO firms and the government. Thus, whether the CSRC Regulation
No. 12-1996 can enhance the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is still an empirical
question. Based on the above discussions, we develop two hypotheses with regard to
forecast bias and forecast accuracy, respectively:
H1

IPO earnings forecasts have been less optimistic after the promulgation of the
Regulation than before.

H2

IPO earnings forecasts have been more accurate after the promulgation of the
Regulation than before.

4.

Research Design

4.1

Sample selection
The sample of this study includes all Chinese IPOs over the period 1991 to 2005 that

satisfy the following criteria:
(1) IPO prospectuses are available on www.cnlist.com, a Chinese website that provides
all information disclosed by Chinese listed companies,
(2) Earnings forecasts for the IPO year are disclosed in the prospectuses,
(3) Earnings forecasts for the IPO year are based on profit before tax (firms that only
issued forecasts of net income are excluded from the sample),8 and
8

Although the income tax rate is 33% for all non-public Chinese companies, it is not uniform and is

determined by local tax authority after a firm is publicly listed. The annual profit for the IPO year may be taxed
on a post-IPO rate for the whole year, or be taxed on a pre-IPO rate for the pre-IPO period and on a post-IPO

9

(4) Other data are available for analysis.
Insert Table 1 about here
The above criteria yield the final sample consisting of 858 IPO firms over the period
1991 to 2005. Table 1, panel A reports the distribution of these sample firms by year. A
total of 313 and 545 firms went public before and after the end of 1996, respectively. An
interesting phenomenon is that only 62 IPO earnings forecasts were issued after 2000,
suggesting that few Chinese IPO firms have been willing to disclose earnings forecasts in
their prospectuses after the CSRC changed the mandatory disclosure of IPO earnings
forecasts into a voluntary requirement on March 15, 2001.9 Table 1, panel B provides the
distribution of sample firms by CRSC industry classification. About 59% of our sample
firms are manufacturing companies. In addition, 502 out of the 858 sample firms are listed
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the other 356 firms are listed on the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange.

4.2

Univariate analysis
The reliability of earnings forecasts can be decomposed into a bias component and an

accuracy component. Forecast bias for an IPO firm is measured by forecast error (FE),
which is commonly defined as follows:10

rate for the rest of the year. Hence, we use forecasts of profit before tax instead of forecasts of net income to
avoid any impact due to changes in post-IPO tax policy on forecast reliability.
9

10

There are 54 IPO earnings forecasts disclosed after March 15, 2001 in our sample.
See McConomy (1998), Clarkson (2000), Hartnett and Romcke (2000), Lonkani and Firth (2005), El-

Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006), etc.
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FE = (A – F) / │F│

(1)

where
F = earnings forecast for the IPO year,
A = actual earnings for the IPO year.
We focus on earnings forecasts for the IPO year because many IPO firms did not issue
forecasts for years after the IPO year. A negative (positive) sign of FE indicates that
earnings forecasts are overestimated (underestimated) for an IPO firm. However, the average
forecast error across firms may not accurately reflect the average size of forecast errors
because negative and positive errors cancel each other out.
Following prior research, forecast accuracy for an IPO firm is measured by absolute
forecast error (AFE), that is,
AFE = │A – F│ / │F│

(2)

Earnings forecasts with lower AFE are more accurate than forecasts with higher AFE.
We first conduct univariate analysis to test the two hypotheses about the effects of the
CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 on IPO forecast credibility. Both forecast error (FE) and
absolute forecast error (AFE) of IPO earnings forecasts issued after the end of 1996 are
compared with those issued before the end of 1996. We use the end of 1996 as the clear-cut
date because the Regulation became effective as of December 26, 1996. Both student t-tests
and Wilcoxon tests are employed for the comparisons. Using Wilcoxon tests can mitigate the
potential effect of outliers on the results. If the reliability of IPO earnings forecasts is
significantly affected by the Regulation, the two hypotheses will not be statistically rejected.
The two hypotheses are also tested by conducting regression analysis as described in the next
subsection.

11

4.3

Regression analysis
We run the following pooled regression to test the two hypotheses after controlling

for several factors that may affect IPO forecast reliability:11
FE (AFE) = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3FH+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8GDP
+β9STE + Industry dummies + ε

(3)

where
FE = Forecast error,
AFE

= Absolute forecast error,

REG = the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996,
SIZE = Firm size,
FH

= Forecast horizon,

PEV

= Past earnings variability,

LEV

= Financial leverage,

BIG5

= Big Five auditor,

RTO = Retention ownership,
GDP = GDP growth rate,
STE

= Stock exchange.

The test variable (REG) equals to “1” if a firm went public after the end of 1996 and
“0” if before the end of 1996. The control variables are defined as follows. Firm size (SIZE)
is measured as the logarithm value of total assets at the end of the IPO year. Forecast horizon
11

The pooled regression does not lead to any serial correlations because each firm has only one

observation in the sample.
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(FH) is measured as the number of months between the forecast date and the end of the IPO
year. If the forecast date belongs to the first (second) half of a month, that month is (not)
counted when calculating forecast horizon.12 Past earnings variability (PEV) is computed by
dividing the standard deviation of earnings across the three years prior to the IPO year by the
mean of the three years’ earnings (Cheng & Firth, 2000; Lonkani & Firth, 2005). Financial
leverage (LEV) is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets at the end of the IPO
year. Big Five auditor (BIG5) is coded “1” if the auditor is a Big Five firm and “0”
otherwise. Retention ownership (RTO) is the percentage of total equity retained by extant
owners after the initial public offering. GDP growth rate (GDP) is yearly Gross Domestic
Product growth rate. The stock exchange dummy (STE) is coded “1” if a firm is listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange and “0” if listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Industry
dummies are coded “1” if there are at least 10 sample firms from an industry and “0”
otherwise.13
We include the control variables in the regression model based on the literature. Prior
research considers firm size as a potential factor affecting earnings forecast accuracy. For
instance, Hagerman and Ruland (1979) suggest that larger firms can produce more accurate
forecasts because they are more diversified and thus are better able to survive economic
changes than smaller firms. Cox (1995) argues that larger firms have adequate human
resources to prepare high-quality forecasts and a stable earnings process in which earnings
12

For example, the forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 06/14/1997 is 7 months, and the

forecast horizon for a firm that went public on 08/16/1996 is 4 months. The fiscal year end is December 31 for
all Chinese companies.
13

All continuous variables in the model are winsorized at 1% and 99%.
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are more predictable. Larger firms may also have better control over their market settings,
and thus may be less susceptible to economic fluctuations (Firth & Smith, 1992).
It has been argued that an important determinant of forecast reliability is forecast
horizon. A negative association between forecast horizon and forecast accuracy is reported
in earlier U.S. studies (Collins & Hopwood, 1980; Brown, Foster, & Noreen, 1985). As
earnings forecast is an inherently uncertain process, the longer the forecast horizon the
greater the possibility that unexpected events may occur. Additionally, forecasts developed
on a date close to the end of the forecast period may incorporate more updated information
and thus are more reliable.
Another potential determinant of forecast reliability is past earnings variability. Porter
(1982) documents a negative association between past earnings variability and forecast
accuracy in the U.S. As past earnings data are usually used as inputs to the forecasting
process, it might be more difficult to forecast earnings if past data show a large variation
across different years. In addition, the performance of a firm is usually sensitive to local and
global market conditions, interest rate movements, exchange rate movements, etc. The
effects of these factors on a firm’s future performance might be incorporated in past earnings
variability (Eddy & Seifert, 1992).
A firm’s financial leverage may also affect its forecast reliability. Clarkson (2000)
finds significant evidence that earnings forecasts are less accurate for firms with high
leverage in Canada although the results are sensitive to alternative specifications. Eddy and
Seifert (1992) suggest that higher leverage may make earnings forecasting more difficult
because firms with relatively high debt levels are likely to experience more volatile earnings.
Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1998) find that even a modest decline in sales relative to

14

management’s expectations is likely to result in a large earnings shortfall for firms with high
financial leverage.
IPO earnings forecasts are required to be audited by certified public accountants in
China. Simunic and Stein (1987) argue that Big Five accounting firms produce high-quality
audits. Big Five firms should have a strong incentive to provide high quality services in
order to maintain their good reputations (DeAngelo, 1981; Healy & Lys, 1986). Hartnett and
Romcke (2000) and Cheng and Firth (2000) find that auditor quality is positively associated
with IPO forecast accuracy in Australia and Hong Kong, respectively. Thus, we include
BIG5 in the model.
Retention ownership may also relate to the reliability of IPO forecasts. Keasey and
McGuinness (1991) argue that firms with a lower level of equity retention may inflate their
earnings forecasts in order to maximize the issuance proceeds. Further, an entrepreneur who
retains less equity may be less concerned with a firm’s adverse reputation resulted from
inaccurate earnings forecasts. In addition, firms with a higher level of retention may have
less variation in financial performance compared to firms with a lower level of retention,
because the former is less affected by expansion of their scales. Consistently, El-Rajabi and
Gunasekaran (2006) find significant evidence on the positive association between retention
ownership and forecast accuracy in Jordan.
Finally, we add GDP growth rate for the IPO year in the model to control for the
effect of general economic conditions on forecast reliability. We also include a stock
exchange dummy in the model. To control for fixed industry effects, we include industry
dummies in the model.

15

We expect a positive and significant coefficient on REG for the model with forecast
error (FE) as dependent variable if H1 is supported. We also expect a negative and
significant coefficient on REG for the model with absolute forecast error (AFE) as dependent
variable if H2 is supported.

5.

Empirical Results
Table 2, panel A reports the distribution of forecast errors for the sample of 858 IPO

earnings forecasts. Table 2, panel B presents the distribution of optimistic earnings forecasts
across years. We find that 49.41% of the 858 forecasts were overestimated, whereas 50.59%
of the forecasts were underestimated. The distribution of forecast errors for Chinese IPO
earnings forecasts seems fairly symmetric. About 55% of the sample firms have forecast
errors in a range between -10% and +10%, compared to 8% of Australian forecasts
(Hartnett, 1993), 45.97% of Malaysian forecasts (Jelic et al., 1998), and 4.9% of Jordanian
forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006). About 75% of the sample firms have forecast
errors in a range between -20% and +20%, compared to 55% of Canadian forecasts (Pedwell
et al., 1994), 19% of New Zealand forecasts (Firth & Smith, 1992), and 7.3% of Jordanian
forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006). Moreover, about 0.8% of the sample firms have
forecast errors beyond the range of -100% to +100%, compared to 53% of Australian
forecasts (Hartnett, 1993) and 39.0% of Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran,
2006).
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3, panel A reports the descriptive statistics on forecast bias and forecast
accuracy of Chinese IPO earnings forecasts. The mean forecast error and mean absolute

16

forecast error are 0.45% and 15.28%, respectively, for the full sample. Comparatively, the
mean absolute forecast error is 289% for Australian forecasts (Hartnett, 1993), 100% for
New Zealand forecasts (Mak, 1989), 88% for Canadian forecasts (Pedwell et al., 1994),
163.4% for Jordanian forecasts (El-Rajabi & Gunasekaran, 2006), 35.76% for Thailand
forecasts (Lonkani & Firth, 2005), 27.91% for Malaysian forecasts (Mohamad, Nassir,
Kuing, & Ariff, 1994), 18% for Hong Kong forecasts (Chan, Sit, Tong, Wong, & Chan,
1996), 11% for British forecasts (Keasey & McGuiness, 1991), and 10.4% for Singaporean
forecasts (Firth, Kwok, Liau-Tan, & Yeo, 1995). Our findings suggest that Chinese IPO
forecast errors are moderate compared to other countries, consistent with the evidence
provided by Chen and Firth (1999).14
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3, panel A also reports that the mean and median forecast error are 1.60% and
0.18%, respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to -1.55% and 0.05%, respectively,
before the end of 1996. The mean and median absolute forecast error are 14.46% and 8.31%,
respectively, after the end of 1996, compared to 16.72% and 9.89%, respectively, before the
end of 1996. Table 3, panel B provides evidence on univariate tests of the two hypotheses.
Both t-test and Wilcoxon test show that earnings forecasts are significantly less optimistic
after the promulgation of the Regulation than before (t-statistic = 1.97 and z-statistic = 2.09,
respectively), consistent with H1. The univariate tests also show that earnings forecasts are
significantly more accurate after the promulgation of the Regulation than before (t-statistic =
-1.80 and z-statistic = -1.55, respectively), consistent with H2. These results suggest that the
14

In addition, Chen and Firth (1999) find that earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses are more

accurate than time series extrapolations of historical earnings.
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CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 enhances the credibility of earnings forecasts contained in
Chinese IPO prospectuses.
Insert Table 4 about here
Table 4, panel A tabulates the descriptive statistics on the independent variables used
in the regression analysis. Table 4, panel B reports Pearson correlations among the
independent variables. As the correlation between REG and GDP is highly negative (r =
-0.76), we first conduct collinearity diagnostics for the regression analysis. We find that the
components associated with a high condition index (i.e., greater than 30) do not contribute
strongly to the variance of two or more variables (i.e., variance proportion greater than about
0.5). Thus, multicollinearity is not a substantive issue when both REG and GDP are included
in the regression model.
Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. Table 5, columns 2 and 3
report the results on testing H1. We find that REG is positive and significant (t-statistic =
3.31), consistent with H1. Thus, results from the univariate tests of H1 still hold after adding
control variables in the regression model. Our findings suggest that the CSRC Regulation
No. 12-1996 mitigates the overestimation of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO prospectuses.
In addition, we find that the coefficient on LEV is significantly negative (t-statistic = -1.61),
suggesting that IPO firms with higher financial leverage issued more optimistic earnings
forecasts than IPO firms with lower financial leverage.
Table 5, columns 4 and 5 report the results on testing H2. We find a negative and
significant coefficient on REG (t-statistic = -1.71), consistent with H2. Hence, results
obtained from the univariate tests of H2 still hold after we control for potential confounding
effects in the regression. Overall, the regression analysis provides further evidence that the
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CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 enhances the accuracy of earnings forecasts in Chinese IPO
prospectuses.
Insert Table 5 about here
In addition, we find that the coefficient on forecast horizon (FH) is significantly
positive (t-statistic = 6.98), consistent with the studies in Canada (Davidson & Neu, 1993;
Clarkson, 2000), New Zealand (Mak, 1989), the U.K. (Keasey & McGuinness, 1991),
Australia (Hartnett, 1993), Singapore (Firth et al., 1995), and Thailand (Lonkani & Firth,
2005). This finding suggests that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts with shorter horizon are
more accurate than those with longer horizon. Also, past earnings variability (PEV) is
positively associated with absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.96), consistent with a Hong
Kong study by Chan et al. (1996). Thus, Chinese IPO firms with lower past earnings
variability issue more accurate earnings forecasts than those with higher past earnings
variability. Moreover, we find that financial leverage (LEV) is positively associated with
absolute forecast error (t-statistic = 1.82), suggesting that Chinese IPO earnings forecasts
with higher financial leverage are less accurate than those with lower financial leverage.
Finally, we document a negative and significant coefficient on retention ownership (RTO) (tstatistic = -1.43), consistent with a Jordanian study by El-Rajabi and Gunasekaran (2006).
Thus, Chinese IPO earnings forecasts are more accurate for firms with higher ownership
retention than for those with lower ownership retention.

6.

Additional Analyses
We also conduct additional analyses as follows. First, we examine whether the

results of our regression analysis are sensitive to using alternative measures of forecast bias
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and accuracy. We consider five different ways to calculate FE and AFE by using (1)
absolute actual earnings (Cheng & Firth, 2000), (2) total assets (Hartnett, 2006), (3) sales, (4)
book value of common equity, or (5) market value of common equity as the denominator in
the formulae of FE and AFE, respectively. Table 6 reports the results on the alternative
measures of forecast reliability. We find that earnings forecasts have been significantly less
optimistic after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, regardless of which
alternative measure is used ( t-statistic = 3.83, 3.49, 2.82, 3.64, and 2.13, respectively). We
also find that forecast accuracy, as measured by one of the five different ways, has been
significantly higher after the promulgation of the Regulation (t-statistic =-3.14, -4.45, -3.97,
-4.53, and -1.34, respectively). Thus, our results are not sensitive to the use of alternative
proxies for forecast reliability.
Insert Table 6 about here
Second, we examine whether earnings forecasts being less optimistic after 1996 was
due to management’s overstatement of ex post earnings realization rather than the impact of
the Regulation on management’s ex ante forecasting behaviour. As firms will be penalized
by the CSRC if their IPO earnings forecasts are overstated, management may feel more
pressure to manage IPO year’s actual earnings to meet their pre-IPO forecasts. We measure
earnings management as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of
cash flow from operations (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003), and add this measure in eq.
(3) to control for the effects of earnings management on IPO forecast bias and accuracy. We
find that REG is positively associated with forecast error and is negatively associated with
absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 3.32 and -1.71), consistent with our results
reported earlier in the text. In addition, we use actual earnings for the year prior to the IPO
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instead of actual earnings for the IPO year in computing forecast error. We document that
the mean and median forecast error were -11.27% and -13.17%, respectively, in 1997, and
were -30.12% and -30.86%, respectively, in 1996. Both t-test and Wilcoxon test show that
earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated tstatistic = 6.42 and z-statistic = 7.67, respectively). These results suggest that the less
optimistic IPO earnings forecasts in 1997 were not resulted from management’s
overstatement of ex post earnings realization to meet their pre-IPO forecasts.
Third, we examine whether earnings forecast being more reliable after the Regulation
is confounded by the development of market infrastructure such as the accumulation of
investors’ knowledge and experience, the development of institutional investors, and the
improvement in information disclosure environment. We conduct three tests to address this
concern. We first compare forecast reliability for IPOs before 1996 and IPOs in 1996 by
estimating eq. (3). We find that forecast bias was not different for the two sub-periods (nontabulated t-statistic = 0.06), whereas IPO earnings forecasts were less accurate in 1996 than
before 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 1.98). These findings suggest that Chinese IPO
forecast reliability had not been improved before the promulgation of the Regulation at the
end of 1996. We then estimate eq. (3) using IPO forecasts from 1996 and 1997 only.
Compared to the regressions using several years’ data, this test is more likely to mitigate
confounding effects as there are fewer changes in market infrastructure in a single year than
in several years. We find that earnings forecasts were significantly less optimistic in 1997
than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.00), although forecast accuracy was not
significantly improved in 1997 than in 1996 (non-tabulated t-statistic = -0.98). To control for
the effects of forecast bias, we run regression for absolute forecast error by including forecast
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error in eq. (3). We find that forecast accuracy was significantly higher in 1997 than in 1996
(non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.87), suggesting that the insignificant change in forecast
accuracy from 1996 to 1997 before controlling for forecast error could be due to IPO firms’
over-conservative forecasting in 1997. Moreover, we estimate eq. (3) by adding two marketwide variables for each year. Specifically, we use the correlation coefficient between
earnings and stock return for all listed firms in each year to reflect changes in information
disclosure environment (Frankel, Kothari, & Weber, 2006). We also use the ratio of market
value of common shares held by all institutional investors over the total market capitalization
in each year to reflect the development in institutional investors. We find that, consistent
with our findings reported earlier, IPO earnings forecasts are less optimistic and more
accurate after the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 (non-tabulated tstatistic = 4.37 and -1.40, respectively). Overall, these three tests provide evidence
supporting that IPO forecast reliability being more reliable after the Regulation is not
confounded by changes in market infrastructure.
Fourth, we examine whether IPO earnings forecasts being less optimistic in 1997 was
driven by the Asian Financial Crisis. We compare forecast error for IPOs in 1996 with IPOs
in the first half of 1997 as the Asian Financial Crisis started with the collapse of the Thai
currency market on July 2, 1997 (Jeon & Seo, 2003). Of the 172 IPOs in 1997, 125
companies went public in the first half of 1997 (i.e., before the Asian Financial Crisis). By
estimating eq. (3) for forecast error using IPOs in 1996 and IPOs in the first half of 1997, we
find that IPO earnings forecasts were less optimistic for the first half of 1997 than for 1996
(non-tabulated t-statistic = 3.88). This finding suggests that IPO earnings forecasts being less
optimistic in 1997 was not driven by the Asian Financial Crisis.
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Fifth, we examine the determinants of forecast accuracy before and after the
promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 separately. For the period before the
promulgation, we find that forecast horizon and past earnings variability are significantly
positively associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.15 and 1.42,
respectively). For the period after the promulgation, we find that forecast horizon, financial
leverage, and Big Five auditor are significantly positively associated with absolute forecast
error (non-tabulated t-statistic = 4.89, 2.07, and 1.88, respectively). These results suggest a
temporal change in the pattern of the determinants of forecast accuracy.
Sixth, we examine whether shifting from mandatory to voluntary disclosure of
earnings forecasts affects IPO earnings forecast reliability after March 15, 2001. In our
sample, only 54 IPO firms voluntarily disclosed earnings forecasts after March 15, 2001, and
we compare forecast reliability for these 54 firms with the 134 firms that mandatorily issued
earnings forecasts between January 1, 2000 and March 15, 2001.15 We find that there is no
significant difference in either forecast bias or forecast accuracy between voluntary and
mandatory disclosure. We also examine the determinants of forecast accuracy for the 54
firms with voluntary disclosure. We find that forecast horizon, financial leverage, and Big
Five auditor are significantly positively associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated
t-statistic = 1.36, 1.84, and 2.31, respectively), and retention ownership is negatively
associated with absolute forecast error (non-tabulated t-statistic = -1.36).
Finally, we examine whether IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996. If
the enactment of the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 constrains managerial motivation in

15

Eight out of the 134 firms issued IPO earnings forecasts between January 1 and March 15, 2001.
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overstating forecasts for increasing offer price, IPOs would be more underpricing for 1997
than for 1996. We estimate the following model to test this conjecture:
UDP = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3PRCD+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8ROA
+ Industry dummies + ε

(4)

where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price
divided by offer price. REG is coded “1” for IPOs in 1997 and “0” for IPOs in 1996. PRCD
is IPO proceeds, computed as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds. ROA is return on assets,
measured as net income deflated by total assets. Based on prior research (e.g., Beatty, 1989;
Willenborg, 1999; Willenborg & McKeown, 2001), we include control variables in eq. (4) to
control for company size (SIZE), issue size (PRCD), risk (PEV and LEV), auditor reputation
(BIG5), retention ownership (RTO), and profitability (ROA). We expect a positive and
significant coefficient for REG if IPOs were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996.
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 7 presents results on the changes in IPO underpricing from 1996 to 1997. We
find that the coefficient on REG is positive and significant (t-statistic = 1.36). Thus, IPOs
were more underpricing for 1997 than for 1996. Our results suggest that managers were less
motivated to exaggerate earnings forecasts for setting offer price after the enactment of the
CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996. In addition, we document that IPO underpricing is
positively associated with IPO proceeds and audit quality (t-statistic = 6.78 and 3.33,
respectively), and is negatively associated with firm size and return on assets (t-statistic =
-8.75 and -5.74, respectively).
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7.

Conclusion
This study examines whether the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996, Announcement of

Some Rules on the Issuance of Shares, can mitigate the overestimation of earnings forecasts
and improve forecast accuracy in Chinese IPO prospectuses. We find that IPO earnings
forecasts have been less optimistic after the Regulation was promulgated on December 26,
1996. We also find that forecast accuracy has been significantly improved by the Regulation.
Overall, the CSRC Regulation No. 12-1996 can enhance the forecast reliability of IPO
earnings forecasts.
Meanwhile, this study provides evidence on the determinants of Chinese IPO forecast
accuracy. We find that forecast horizon, past earnings variability, and financial leverage are
positively associated with absolute forecast error, and retention ownership is negatively
associated with absolute forecast error.
This study has three contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our
knowledge, no other studies in the literature have been conducted to examine the effects of
securities administrators’ regulations on the reliability of management earnings forecasts.
Second, our findings may provide implications for future regulation promulgation to the
CSRC and other securities regulators in emerging markets. Third, this study suggests some
ex ante criteria for evaluating Chinese earnings forecast accuracy.
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Table 1
Distribution of sample firms
Panel A. By year
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Frequency
1
36
72
22
12
170
172
95
90
126
37
18
3
3
1
858

Percent (%)
0.12
4.20
8.39
2.56
1.40
19.81
20.05
11.07
10.49
14.69
4.31
2.10
0.35
0.35
0.12
100.00

Frequency
23
16
507
34
11
31
53
55
3
36
31
5
53
858

Percent (%)
2.68
1.86
59.09
3.96
1.28
3.61
6.18
6.41
0.35
4.20
3.61
0.58
6.18
100.00

Panel B. By CSRC industry
Industry
Agriculture, forestry, poultry, and fishing
Mining
Manufacture
Utilities
Construction
Transportation and storage
Information technology
Wholesale and retail
Finance and insurance
Real estate
Social service
Media and communication
Conglomerate
Total
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Table 2
Distribution of forecast error
Panel A. Full sample
Forecast Error
≤-1
(-1 , -0.5]
(-0.5, -0.2]
(-0.2, -0.1]
(-0.1, 0]
( 0 , 0.1]
( 0.1, 0.2]
( 0.2 , 0.5]
( 0.5 , 1]
>1
Total

Frequency
2
17
83
96
226
244
74
86
25
5
858

Percent (%)
0.23
1.98
9.67
11.19
26.34
28.44
8.62
10.02
2.91
0.58
100.00

Cumulative Percent (%)
0.23
2.21
11.89
23.07
49.41
77.85
86.48
96.50
99.41
100.00
-

Optimistic forecast
0
19
21
12
4
97
63
49
59
62
23
12
2
1
0
424

Total forecast
1
36
72
22
12
170
172
95
90
126
37
18
3
3
1
858

Percent (%)
0.00
52.78
29.17
54.55
33.33
57.06
36.63
51.58
65.56
48.41
62.16
66.67
66.67
33.33
0.00
49.41

Panel B. By year
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Forecast error (FE) is calculated as follows:
FE = (A – F ) / │F│
where
F = Earnings forecast,
A = Actual earnings.

(1)
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Table 3
Univariate analysis
Panel A. Descriptive statistics

Period
Full sample
Before regulation
After regulation

N
858
313
545

Mean
0.45%
-1.55%
1.60%

FE
Median
0.08%
0.05%
0.18%

Std
0.226
0.243
0.215

Mean
15.28%
16.72%
14.46%

AFE
Median
8.90%
9.89%
8.31%

Std
0.177
0.186
0.171

Panel B. t-tests and Wilcoxon tests
Test
t-statistic
z-statistic

FE
1.97**
2.09**

AFE
-1.80**
-1.55*

“Before regulation” and “After regulation” refer to whether an IPO earnings forecast was issued before or after
the promulgation of the CSRC Regulation No.12-1996
FE is forecast error defined in table 2.
AFE is absolute forecast error defined as follows:
AFE = │A – F│ / │F │
(2)
where
F = Earnings forecast,
A = Actual earnings.
** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed).
* Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed).
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations of independent variables
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Variable
REG
SIZE
FH
PEV
LEV
BIG5
RTO
GDP
STE

N
858
858
858
858
858
858
858
858
858

Mean
0.64
11.22
5.60
0.33
0.36
0.08
0.68
0.09
0.59

Median
1.00
11.14
6.00
0.26
0.36
0.00
0.68
0.09
1.00

Std
0.482
0.872
3.025
0.250
0.149
0.265
0.108
0.020
0.493

Q1
0.00
10.68
3.00
0.15
0.24
0.00
0.61
0.08
0.00

Q3
1.00
11.67
8.00
0.44
0.46
0.00
0.75
0.10
1.00

Panel B. Pearson correlations (n=858)
Variable
REG
SIZE
FH
PEV
LEV
BIG5
RTO
GDP

SIZE
0.39***

FH
0.21***
0.06*

PEV
-0.23***
-0.18***
-0.06*

LEV
-0.22***
0.20***
-0.02
-0.03

BIG5
-0.16***
0.27***
-0.07**
0.04
0.04

RTO
-0.11***
0.25***
-0.05
-0.02
0.05
0.40***

GDP
-0.76***
-0.32***
-0.11***
0.18***
0.12***
0.24***
0.20***

STE
-0.04
0.03
-0.02
0.06*
-0.04
0.05
0.15***
0.14***

REG is coded “1” if a firm went public after the end of 1996 and “0” if before the end of 1996.
SIZE is measured by the logarithm value of total assets.
FH is measured as the number of months between the forecast date and the end of the IPO year.
PEV is computed by dividing the standard deviation of earnings across the three years prior to the IPO
year by the mean of the three years’ earnings.
LEV is measured by the total liabilities over the total assets.
BIG5 is coded “1” if the auditor is a Big Five firm and “0” otherwise.
RTO is the percentage of total equity retained by extant owners after the initial public offering.
GDP is Gross Domestic Product growth rate.
STE is coded “1” if a firm is listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and “0” if listed on the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange.
*** Significant at the level of 1% (two-tailed).
** Significant at the level of 5% (two-tailed).
* Significant at the level of 10% (two-tailed).
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Table 5
Regression analysis
AFE

FE
Variable
Intercept
REG
SIZE
FH
PEV
LEV
BIG5
RTO
GDP
STE
Industry dummies

Coefficient
-0.107
0.090
-0.004
-0.002
0.041
-0.092
0.032
-0.068
1.707
-0.032

t-statistic
-0.64
3.31***
-0.35
-0.75
1.28
-1.61*
0.93
-0.83
2.69***
-2.01**

Coefficient
0.165
-0.036
-0.003
0.014
0.048
0.080
0.032
-0.090
-0.173
-0.006

t-statistic
1.28
-1.71**
-0.29
6.98***
1.96**
1.82**
1.20
-1.43*
-0.36
-0.46

Included

Included

858
1.59**
1.36%

858
3.66***
5.86%

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

The regression model is as follows:
FE (AFE) = α+β1REG+β2SIZE+β3FH+β4PEV+β5LEV+β5BIG5+β6RTO+β8GDP+β9STE
+Industry dummies + error
where the variables in equation (3) are defined in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed).
** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed).
* Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed).
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(3)

Table 6
Results on alternative measures of FE and AFE
FE
Denominator
Absolute actual earnings
Total assets
Sales
Book value of common equity
Market value of common equity

Coefficient
0.150
0.008
0.016
0.014
0.005

AFE
t-statistic
3.83***
3.49***
2.82***
3.64***
2.13**

Coefficient
-0106
-0.008
-0.018
-0.014
-0.002

t-statistic
-3.14***
-4.45***
-3.97***
-4.53***
-1.34*

Eq.(3) is estimated by using alternative measures of FE and AFE based on the denominator of absolute
actual earnings, total assets, sales, book value of common equity, and market value of common equity,
respectively, instead of absolute earnings forecast.
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed).
** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed).
* Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed).
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Table 7
IPO underpricing
Variable
Intercept
REG
SIZE
PRCD
PEV
LEV
BIG5
RTO
ROA

Coefficient
1.199
0.129
-0.507
0.582
0.137
-0.295
0.647
0.406
-3.457

t-statistic
1.68**
1.36*
-8.75***
6.78***
0.95
-1.02
3.33***
1.12
-5.74***

Industry dummies

Included

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

340
8.18***
25.31%

The regression model is as follows:
UDP = α +β1REG +β2SIZE+β3PRCD+β4PEV+β5LEV+β6BIG5+β7RTO+β8ROA
+ Industry dummies + error
(2)
where UDP is IPO underpricing, measured as first-day closing price minus offer price divided by offer
price. REG is coded “1” for IPOs in 1997 and “0” for IPOs in 1996. PRCD is IPO proceeds, computed
as the logarithm value of IPO proceeds. ROA is return on assets, measured as net income deflated by total
assets. Other variables in eq. (4) are defined in Table 4.
*** Significant at the level of 1% (one-tailed).
** Significant at the level of 5% (one-tailed).
* Significant at the level of 10% (one-tailed).
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